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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, courts have increasingly deferred to military
decisionmakers in judicial review of servicepersons' claims that the armed
forces have constrained or abridged their constitutional rights. Courts have
failed to declare unconstitutional regulations prohibiting political rallies or
speeches on bases, barring the distribution of political pamphlets or circulating
petitions directed to Congress without prior approval, and forbidding symbolic
headgear such as yarmulkes. Courts have also deferred to the judgment of
"military experts" that exclusion of gay and lesbian citizens from military
service and women from combat positions serves important military goals.
Judicial deference to the military takes place on two levels. Some decisions
defer to the military on the merits of a particular case. In addition, the
judiciary increasingly fails to engage in any analysis or balancing of military
needs against individual constitutional claims and is moving toward creation
of a doctrine that military matters are non-justiciable.
Those who defend judicial deference argue that since national security
depends on an effective fighting force, governmental measures that are
indefensible in any other societal sphere are defensible and appropriate for the
"unique institution" of the military.
Most critics of judicial deference have either denied that the military is,
in fact, a "separate sphere," or have argued that it is not separate enough to
justify exceptions to constitutional doctrine. This article presents a different
view. It accepts that the armed forces constitute a "separate sphere" unlike any
other institution but argues that courts must be particularly skeptical of military
decisions precisely because of the military's unique characteristics.
Section II describes the recent history and current state of the deference
doctrine. It then examines criticisms of the doctrine and the counter-response.
Section III suggests that the military, because of its nature and functions, is
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in certain respects dangerous to the maintenance of a working democracy. As
a foundation for understanding the concerns motivating this article, the section
describes civic republican notions of politics and society that influenced the
nation's founders and the rediscovery and development of these ideas by
modern constitutional theorists. Civic republican conceptions of democracy led
the founders to extol the virtues of national defense by a militia of citizen-
soldiers and to caution against the influence of a standing army. While a
standing army rather than a militia has since been considered essential for our
national defense, this section posits that neo-republican ideals of
communicative, participatory democracy combined with the militia ideal
evident in early civic republicanism provide a good guide for evaluating
modern military policies. These ideals suggest that promotion of a strong
democracy and protection of the citizenry from threats posed by a powerful
armed forces require diverse citizen involvement in the military and promotion
of servicepersons' involvement in democratic politics. Scrutiny of military
policies against these templates would allow the nation to support an effective,
professional armed forces while guarding against the dangers inherent in
standing armies.
Section IV applies the lessons of Section III to the modern United States'
military and concludes that policies excluding women from combat and gay
and lesbian people from all military service create a dangerous exclusivity and
partisanship in the armed forces and contribute to discrimination, a lack of
communicative politics, and subordination of women and homosexuals in
society as a whole. These policies of exclusion, combined with those that
curtail the political activities of military personnel, effectively disable
servicepersons from involvement and growth as citizens in a diverse polity.
They also limit the public information about internal military affairs,
knowledge crucial to citizen control of the armed forces. Recent revelations
about abuses within the military illustrate that the military expertise courts use
to justify a doctrine of deference is often shaped not by military necessity but
by the personal prejudices and interests of military decisionmakers.
Section V anticipates the charge that modification of speech, dress, or
exclusion policies would reduce discipline within the ranks and thereby
endanger the nation's security. It points out that the military has already
successfully modified traditional practices once thought essential for effective
discipline. Proponents of judicial deference to current policies ignore greater
dangers posed by policies that allow the military to contribute to the decay of
democracy in a pluralistic society-by not allowing military members to
develop skills required for democratic participation, by teaching that
constitutional constraints do not apply to the military, and by promoting a
patriotism of blind obedience. Furthermore, the risk that military force might
be turned against the civilian population is far greater from an obedient,
unquestioning force representing only a subsection of society than from a
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reflective and diverse body of servicemembers.
Finally, Section VI anticipates and addresses the charge that the judiciary
is not the proper body to effect the changes proposed in this article. It argues
that the judiciary, given its role in our democracy, must take responsibility for
carefully scrutinizing matters concerning the military and holding that
institution accountable for its actions.
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE, ITS CRITICS, AND DEFENDERS
A. Judicial Deference to the Military
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that "our citizens in uniform
may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their
civilian clothes."' Despite this proclamation, the Court has presided over a
steady erosion of servicepersons' rights and a concomitant expansion of the
military's power over those it conscripts or employs. The Court has defended
the importance of judicial deference not only to the political branches charged
with controlling the military but also to the judgments of military
decisionmakers themselves. While the Court has asserted that it cannot
"abdicate [its] ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional question[s],"2
it has proceeded to do just that through a series of decisions in which it has
found either that the interests of the military outweigh the constitutional claims
presented, or that claims against the military are unreviewable.
The basic justification for deference was set forth in Orloffv. Willoughby,3
one of the earliest4 of the judicial deference cases:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility
for setting up the channels through which such grievances can be
considered and fairly settled rests upon Congress and upon the
President of the United States and his subordinates. The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary
be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the
Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.'
1. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188 (1962)).
2. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
3. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
4. Even earlier than Orloffv. Willoughby was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in
which the Supreme Court deferred to military and political leaders in allowing the internment of Americans
of Japanese descent during World War II, a decision that has since been widely critized. See infra notes
73-77 and accompanying text. However, perhaps because of the infamy of the case, courts seem never to
cite Korematsu as precedent for the military deference doctrine.
5. Orloff, 345 U.S. at 93-94.
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One commentator has described the Orloff dictum as "a charter for judicial
abdication. "6
The constitutional foundation for judicial deference to the military is found
in the explicit grant to the Congress of the power to "raise and support
Armies,"7 to "provide and maintain a Navy,"' "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"' and in the status
of the President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States." 10 Courts also have referred to the broad authority granted to the
political branches, especially Congress, to delegate many decisions to the
military itself. Combined with these constitutional provisions, some have found
support for a doctrine of deference in the words of the nation's founders, who
argued that the Constitution should not place limits on the power of the new
nation to provide for its defense.'" Concerns regarding constitutional
allocation of power and the importance of national defense are central to
courts' hesitancy to subject the military to scrutiny.
1. Curtailment of Political Speech and Religious Expression
One significant line of cases in the development of judicial deference
concerns the first amendment rights of servicepersons to speak out against
military mobilizations. In Parker v. Levy 12 a conscripted physician assigned
to train medical personnel refused to train special-forces personnel 3 and
urged enlisted men, particularly African-American soldiers, to refuse to fight
in Vietnam. 4 Levy was convicted under the general articles set forth in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which forbid "conduct unbecoming an
6. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA
L. REV. 499, 565 (1991). See also Linda Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel:
Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 865 (1987) ("[Als the law currently
stands, the mere invocation of military necessity is sufficient to trump a serviceperson's claims that his
or her first amendment rights have been violated by the military.").
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
8. Id. at cl. 13.
9. Id. at cl. 14.
10. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
11. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, The Tenth Charles L. Decker Lecture in Administrative and Civil
Law: Civil Liberty and Military Necessity - Some Preliminary Thoughts on Goldman v. Weinberger, 113
MIL. L. REV. 31, 42 (1986):
These powers [essential to the common defense] ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them .... And unless it can
be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain
determinable limits ... it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no
limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community,
in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961)).
12. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). For a more complete discussion of the case, see Sugin, supra note 6, at
865-67.
13. Parker, 417 U.S. at 736-37.
14. Id. at 769-70 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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officer" and conduct prejudicial "to good order and discipline.""
5 He
challenged the general articles as unconstitutionally vague, arguing that they
chilled the free speech of servicemembers.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Rehnquist, upheld the regulations.
While recognizing the Court's departure in the case from established
constitutional vagueness standards, Rehnquist defended the decision by
asserting, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
civilian society .... While the members of the military are not excluded from
the protection granted by the first amendment, the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application
of those protections."16 Rehnquist justified carving out a special military
exception to otherwise clearly unconstitutional regulations by reference to
"[t]he extreme degree of discipline that the military establishment must
maintain in order to serve its crucial function."17 The Court invoked that
justification repeatedly in the years after Parker.
In two other cases in which military regulations were challenged on the
basis of first amendment claims the Court sharply limited the degree to which
military personnel can engage in collective political activity. First, in Greer
v. Spock,'5 civilians seeking access to a military base challenged local base
regulations that required anyone seeking to distribute political literature or hold
political speeches on the base to gain approval from local commanders.' 9
Under these regulations, a commander had authority to bar literature or
speeches that the commander believed would constitute a "clear danger to the
loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base."20 The Court held that
the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. Although the Court stated
that a particular incident of restraint by a particular commander might be
struck down if the regulations were "applied irrationally, invidiously, or
arbitrarily,"21 the majority did not suggest what would constitute an
unconstitutional application of the regulations.
Next, in Brown v. Glines,22 the Court upheld Air Force regulations
requiring servicemembers to obtain permission from their commanders before
soliciting signatures for petitions on Air Force bases.' The Court found
unpersuasive the argument that Greer was distinguishable because civilians not
15. Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) arts. 133-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (1982).
16. Parker, 417 U.S. at 743, 758.
17. Mary Jo Donahue, Note, First Amendment Rights in the Military Context: What Deference is Due?
- Goldman v. Weinberger, 20 CREiGHrON L. REV. 85, 100 (1986) (citing Parker, 417 U.S. at 749;
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 304 (1983); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38, 48 (1976)).
18. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
19. Id. at 831 (quoting Fort Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968); Fort Dix Reg. 210-27 (1970)).
20. Id. at 840.
21. Id.
22. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
23. The plaintiffs in Brown had sought to circulate a petition addressed to members of Congress and
to the Secretary of Defense regarding Air Force grooming standards. Id. at 351.
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otherwise connected with the base had brought the challenge.24 In upholding
the Air Force regulations, the Court expressed a willingness to trust a
commander's determination of what kinds of material would constitute "a clear
threat to the readiness of his troops."' It defended this willingness by
pointing to the wording of the Air Force regulation that "advises commanders
to preserve servicemen's 'right of expression . .. to the maximum extent
possible.'"26
Brown is disturbing for two reasons. First, while previous opinions had
found a military interest in disciplining servicepersons to obtain their
"effective response to command,"27 the Court in Brown asserted the
importance of the military's interest in the "'unquestioned' obedience" of
military members.2" The move from "effective" obedience to "unquestioned"
obedience seems small when considered at the level of a response to a
particular command at a particular moment. When considered in the more
general context of the military's power as an institution, the difference suggests
that the military has a legitimate interest in stifling all internal dissent.
Furthermore, it suggests that courts ought not allow armed forces' personnel
to question military determinations by way of legal challenges to military
regulations or policies.
Second, and perhaps most disturbing, was the Court's willingness to ignore
the impact such regulations controlling political speech have on military
personnel. Since military members often live as well as work on base,
regulations that limit what they say or hear while at work limit what they say
and hear altogether.29 As a result of the Brown decision, not only are
servicemembers stripped of their First Amendment freedoms, but they become
vulnerable to imposition of penalties that do not exist outside the military.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, members of the armed forces are
subject to a broad array of criminal sanctions for certain types of speech.30
The most recent and most ominous case decided by the Supreme Court with
regard to First Amendment rights is the 1986 decision Goldman v.
Weinberger.31 There, the Court upheld an Air Force regulation that forbids
uniformed servicepersons to wear headgear indoors. Goldman, an Air Force
psychologist and rabbi whose religious convictions required him to wear a
yarmulke at all times, challenged the regulation as an unconstitutional
infringement on the free exercise of religion. The Court, citing past decisions
24. Id. at 356 n.13.
25. Id. at 353.
26. Id. at 355 (quoting Department of Defense Directive 1325.6 (1969)).
27. See James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's
Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L. REV. 177, 196 (1984).
28. See id.
29. Sugin, supra note 6, at 869. See also infra note 161 and accompanying text.
30. Sugin, supra note 6, at 869 (citing U.C.M.J. art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1982) (contempt toward
officials); U.C.M.J. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1982) (disrespect toward superior officer); U.C.M.J. art.
91, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1982) (insubordinate conduct including disrespectful language)).
31. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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regarding judicial deference to the military, rejected his claims.32
The most disturbing aspect of Goldman was the Court's failure to reach
the merits of the case.33 In response to Goldman's claim that the Air Force
had failed to offer a "scintilla of proof"34 in support of its policy, the
majority stated that need for or effectiveness of a policy was "quite beside the
point" because "appropriate military officials" had decided that the dress
regulations were desirable." The Court effectively declared it would uphold
any regulation promulgated by the military, "no matter how absurd or
unsupported it may be" 6 on the mere assertion by the military that the rule
was necessary.37
The Court's increased deference to military regulations restricting political
and religious expression has coincided with a steady expansion of the military's
jurisdiction. While courts-martial originally had jurisdiction only over felonies
committed by military personnel in wartime,3" they are now the fora in which
servicepersons are tried and convicted for nearly all crimes they commit,
whether such crimes are related to the military or not.39 This authority
includes jurisdiction over "personnel on active duty, reservists while on active
or inactive duty, and retirees who are entitled to pay."'
2. Exclusion of Citizens from Military Service
Courts have also consistently deferred to military judgments that the
military mission necessitates the exclusion of certain segments of the citizenry
32. For a more complete discussion of the case, see Donahue, supra note 17; Sugin, supra note 6,
at 871-76.
33. In Goldman the Court seemed to decide a debate among circuit courts over whether judicial
deference to the military properly occurs through refusing to review claims against the military or at the
merits stage. Several circuits had regularly applied the "Mindes test," first articulated in Mindes v. Seaman,
453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971). The Mindes test provided a structure for ascertaining whether to get
to the merits of a challenge to a particular internal military decision by weighing the nature and strength
of the plaintiff's claim and the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused against the extent of
interference in military affairs such review would cause and the extent to which military discretion or
expertise is involved. Mindes, at 201-02; Gabriel W. Gorenstein, Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional
Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 390-96, 404-09 (1984). But see Pruitt v. Cheney,
963 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3413 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1992) (No. 92-
389) (remanding case concerning military discharge of a lesbian and demanding that district court review
the merits of plaintiff's claim where "[tihe Army does not argue-and the district court did not hold-that
the Mindes test precludes review here.").
34. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
35. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509.
36. Id. at 515 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
37. Id. In response to the Goldman decision, Congress mandated that military members be permitted
to wear "neat and conservative" religious apparel so long as it does not "interfere with the performance
of the member's military duties." 10 U.S.C.S. § 774 (Law. Co-op. 1992). The Air Force then re-wrote
its regulations to allow black or dark blue religious headgear that does not exceed six inches in diameter.
Air Force Reg. § 35-10 (1989). See also Dept. of Defense (DoD) directive 1300.17 (Feb. 3, 1988) (military
policy on religious accomodation); infra note 210 and accompanying text.
38. See Note, Military Justice and Article 111, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1909, 1914-17 (1990) [hereinafter
Military Justice]. See also Sugin, supra note 6, at 860-64.
39. Military Justice, supra note 38, at 1910. See also Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
40. Id. at n.5 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1988)).
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from service. Currently, the military excludes all women from serving in
combat positions4" and excludes all homosexuals from any military service
whatsoever. 
4 2
Military regulations exclude women from "combat positions."43 No
woman has directly challenged these regulations. In Rostker v. Goldberg,"
however, the Court implicitly upheld the exclusion of women from combat
positions in an equal protection challenge brought by a man to the regulations
exempting women from mandatory registration for a possible future draft.4'
In this case, Justice Rehnquist denied that the judiciary had a role in overseeing
the balance of power between the President, Congress, and the military: "The
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training,
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
Branches."' Rehnquist went on to argue that since drafts are designed to
41. For a more complete discussion and criticism of this exclusion, see Karst, supra note 6, at 523-45;
JuDITH STrEHM, ARMS AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN (1989); Lori S. Kornblum, Women Warriors in a
Men's World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 351 (1984).
42. For a more complete discussion and criticism of this exclusion, see Judith Hicks Stiehm,
Symposium: Gender and Law Essay and Article: Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy:
Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992); Karst, supra note 6, at 545-63 (criticizing the
exclusion policy as a tool to boost the perceived masculinity of the military and its members); Michelle
Benecke and Kirstin Dodge, Recent Development-Military Women in Nontraditional Fields: Casualties
of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215 (1990) (criticizing the exclusion
policy for contributing to sexual harassment of military women); Rhonda Rivera, Sexual Orientation Law,
11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 2, 288 (1986) (review of challenges to the policy to 1986). See generally Josd
Gomez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 LAw & INEQ. J. 121
(1983); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 1508, 1554-75 (1989).
43. Until mid-1991, Congress barred Air Force women from duty "in aircraft engaged in combat
missions," 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1988), and women in the Navy and Marines from duty "on vessels... that
are engaged in combat missions." 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1988). The Congressional ban was lifted by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 531(a), 105
Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991). The Army has been free from such statutory limitation on its placement of women,
but has also excluded them from combat positions. For a review and analysis of Defense Department policy
changes with respect to women, see STIEHM, supra note 41, at 54-67, 134-54. For a discussion of the
services' various definitions of combat, see Kornblum, supra note 41, at 357-65. See also Karst, supra
note 6, at 523 n.90. In early 1992, President Bush formed a Presidential Commission on the Assignment
of Women in the Armed Forces to study and make recommendations on the issue. The Pentagon and
President Clinton have pledged to reconsider the issue of the combat exclusion in 1993 and to consider
the Commission's recommendations. In November 1992, the commission recommended that women be
allowed to serve on most warships but urged that the ban on women flying combat planes be re-codified
into law. The composition of the 15-member panel has been highly controversial. Michael R. Gordon,
Panel is Against Letting Women Fly in Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at A24. Twelve of 15 panelists
are current or former military personnel, and many are admittedly hostile to the idea of putting women
in combat. Michael R. Gordon, Curb on Women in Combat is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1992, at A7;
Rowan Scarborough, Foxhole Privacy at Issue: Women and War Hearings Continue, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1992, at Al.
44. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
45. Karst, supra note 6, at 566.
46. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). Interestingly,
in this case the Court chose to defer to Congress' decision when that decision conflicted with the judgment
of the President and military leaders who had argued before Congress that registration should include
women.
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raise combat troops and women are ineligible for combat, they are "not
similarly situated" for purposes of equal protection analysis.47
The Court also implicitly accepted the exclusion of women from Naval
combat positions in Schlesinger v. Ballard.48 There the Court held against
a military member who claimed that the Navy promotion system denied men
equal protection of the laws because it guaranteed female junior officers a
longer window of time in which to be promoted within the Navy's system of
hierarchy. Usually, officers must be promoted within a certain time frame or
they are discharged.49 The Court justified the disparate treatment by reference
to the greater difficulty faced by female officers in gaining experience for
promotion because so many positions are closed to them. In so doing, the
Court implicitly approved of the exclusion of female officers from many duty
assignments. ° Courts have also deferred to the military in cases challenging
regulations that bar single parents from enlistment,51 a restriction that
disproportionately hinders women seeking to join the military.
The Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the issue of exclusion of
homosexuals from military service, but it has denied certiorari petitions in a
number of circuit court decisions that have deferred to military judgment on
this question. Each of the service branches mandates the discharge of military
members found to be homosexuals. 2 Military decisionmakers justify the
policy by proclaiming that "[h]omosexuality is incompatible with military
service" and "seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military
mission."" The exclusion of gay men and lesbians from military service is
authorized solely by military regulation. Congress' only word on the subject
has been the criminalization of all sodomy by servicemembers, both
homosexual and heterosexual.5 4 The fact that the anti-sodomy statute applies
47. Karst, supra note 6, at 566.
48. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
49. See Hirschhorn, supra note 27, at 197.
50. See id. at 197-99.
51. See Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied., 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
52. See Army Reg. 635-200, chpt. 15; AFM 39-12 (Change 4) Oct. 21, 1970, para. 2-103 (Air Force);
SECNAV Instruction 1900.9A, 2-21 (Navy and Marines).
53. 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1.H (1991).
54. U.C.M.J. art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1982). See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d. 699, 715 n.6
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); Karst, supra note 6, at 548. In 1992, 29 members
of Congress introduced legislation to end the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the armed forces.
Randy Shilts, Proposed Bill Would End Ban on Gays in Armed Forces, SAN FRANCISCO CHRoNIcLE, May
20, 1992, at A8. The Military Freedom Act of 1992 was not taken up by Congress before the end of the
legislative session.
Even if President Clinton makes good on his campaign pledge to lift the ban, many fear that
implementationofan end to the policy would be difficult and slow. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton
to Open Military's Ranks to Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1992, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Challenging
the Military, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1992, at Al. Some fear that an executive order lifting the ban will
not halt continued discharge of gay or lesbian servicemembers through selective enforcement of other
military regulations. Melissa Healy, Clinton to Stress Conduct as Key for Gays in Military, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1992, at Al. If President Clinton in fact signs an executive order lifting the ban, judicial review
of challenges to such discharges may be a critical part of the implementation of an end to the policy.
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to all sexual orientations led the Ninth Circuit, in one case, to question the
appropriateness of deference to military decisionmakers in this area. The court
stated that the statute "reflects an absence of congressional intent to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. ""
Typically, courts reviewing challenges to the exclusion policy rely on
Parker, Brown and Rostker to assert the importance of judicial deference to
the military.56 They then find that the military's restrictive regulations
themselves provide sufficient explanation of the government interest at stake
to justify the exclusion.57 The language of the Seventh Circuit in ben Shalom
v. Marsh-" is typical of such decisions:
The Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Army, and the generals have made the determination about
homosexuality, at least for the present, and we, as judges, should not
undertake to second-guess those with the direct responsibility for our
armed forces. If a change of Army policy is to be made, we should
leave it to those more familiar with military matters than are judges not
selected on the basis of military knowledge. We, as judges, although
opponents of prejudice of any kind, should not undertake to order such
a risky change with possible consequences we cannot safely evaluate.
The Congress, as overseer of the Army and the other military
branches, is also better equipped to make such determinations ...
[T]he branches of the military have great leeway in determining what
55. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d. 1329, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 875 F.2d.
699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
56. See ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 459-62 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296
(1990); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F. 2d 788, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1003 (1990).
57. See, e.g., Beller, 632 F.2d at 811-12. The regulations provide the following explanation for the
policy:
The presence of [homosexual] members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to
maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among
servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate
assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work
under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military
Services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of
security.
32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A, pt. 1.H (1991).
Older cases considered homosexuals a quasi-suspect class but found the military's explanation
satisfactory even if subjected to intermediate scrutiny. See Belier, 632 F.2d at 810 ("government interests
... outweigh whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct");
Hatheway, 641 F.2d. at 1381-82 (army may selectively prosecute homosexual acts of sodomy and not
heterosexual acts of sodomy because prosecution of homosexual acts "bears a substantial relationship to
an important government interest."). More recent cases have applied only rational review to military
exclusion cases, finding homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class. See ben Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464,
465-66; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1074 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (homosexual
sodomy may be criminalized by states without violating due process)).
58. See ben Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296
(1990).
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policies will foster the military mission, and courts will rarely second-
guess those decisions.59
Since the 1980s, only one court has refused in a final decision to defer to the
military regarding the expulsion of a homosexual servicemember, and even
then, only on grounds of estoppel that are likely to be applicable in very few
cases.
6 0
In addition to the explicit exclusion of women from combat and gay men
and lesbians from all military service, judicial deference to regulations
regarding uniforms and physical appearance of servicepersons results in de
facto exclusion of citizens of several religious faiths from military service.
Because of the Goldman decision, those whose religious faith requires outward
demonstration of piety may be forced to avoid military service in order to
maintain their religious convictions. As a consequence, by deferring to
exclusionary regulations, the judiciary has effectively stated that the military
may prevent entire segments of society from joining its ranks, and thereby
maintain itself as an institution that is unrepresentative of American society
as a whole. 1
59. Id.
60. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384
(1990) (Army could not refuse to reenlist 14-year veteran solely on grounds of his homosexuality where
Army had known of his homosexuality from time of enlistment and had accepted him for two prior terms
of reenlistment). The Ninth Circuit explained its lack of deference by reference to the narrow scope of its
decision:
To estop the Army from denying Sgt. Watkins reenlistment on the basis of his homosexuality
would not disrupt any important military policies or adversely affect internal military affairs. It
would simply require the Army to continue to do what it has repeatedly done for fourteen years
with only positive results: reenlist a single soldier with an exceptionally outstanding military
record.
Id. at 706.
Two other cases in which courts seemed ready to challenge the policy were making their way through
the courts as this article went to press. In one case, the Ninth Circuit remanded a discharge decision asking
the Army for a rational explanation of its policy, the first time a court has demanded an explanation beyond
the language of the policy itself. Cheney v. Pruitt, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3413 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1992) (No. 92-389). See infta notes 79-82 and accompanying text. The other
concerned Keith Meinhold, a Naval petty officer discharged after he publicly declared himself to be gay.
U.S. District Court Judge Terry Hatter, Jr., first ordered the Navy to reinstate Meinhold pending resolution
of his case. Judge Orders Gay Sailor Temporarily Reinstated, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1992, at 38. Judge
Hatter ultimately rescinded Meinhold's discharge and permanently enjoined the Navy from discharging
or denying enlistment to any person based solely on his or her sexual orientation. Meinhold v. Dept. of
Defense, No. 92-6044TJH, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 726, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993). Citing Pruitt,
Judge Hatter found that the Navy had failed to "establish, through a factual record, that its policy is
rationally related to its permissible goal." Id. at *3. It is too early to calculate the impact of the Meinhold
decision. Unlike other district court cases unfavorable to the military, the Clinton administration is unlikely
to appeal the decision given the President's stated intention to lift the ban. The opinion, however, has only
persuasive power beyond the Central District of California, and may have only limited impact on challenges
brought by discharged military members in other courts.
61. Sugin, supra note 6, at 874.
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3. Immunity from Tort Liability
Judicial deference has not been limited to allowing the military nearly
complete control over servicepersons' actions and the overall composition of
the armed forces. That deference has also allowed the military to escape tort
liability for injuries to servicepersons, even injuries inflicted intentionally.62
In 1983 the Court denied enlisted military personnel the right to sue superior
officers for damages resulting from infringements of their constitutional
rights.63 Since then, the Court has expanded tort immunity to cover
government officials who have subjected unsuspecting servicepersons to
medical experiments" and to cover civilian suppliers of military equipment
from product liability claims for design defects.65 Taken together, these cases
suggest that issues involving national defense are "inherently above the law
and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed . ".. .66
The reasoning of United States v. Stanley67 demonstrates the frightening
degree to which the Court will permit the military free rein in its treatment
of personnel. The Supreme Court in Stanley denied tort recovery to a
serviceman who was subjected to LSD experiments conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency without his knowledge or consent. The Court did not
disagree that Stanley suffered lasting injuries from the ordeal, nor that the
experiment was a violation of his constitutional due process rights "to be free
to decide for himself whether to submit to drug experimentation."68 But
Justice Scalia argued that any inquiry into military actions to establish the
requisite factors for liability constituted an unacceptable intrusion into military
affairs. He reasoned that judicial process, such as forcing military officers to
testify about their commands, "would.. . be problematic" and "would disrupt
the military regime . ".. ."9
The dissenting opinions correctly point out what was at stake in Stanley.
Justice O'Connor wrote that the CIA's use of Stanley in LSD experimentation
was "so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it
simply cannot be considered a part of the military mission."70 Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, referred to lessons learned
at the Nuremberg trials "that experimentation with unknowing human subjects
is morally and legally unacceptable."7
In its zeal to avoid "intrusion into military affairs," the Stanley opinion
62. For an extensive discussion of this area of doctrine, see Barry Kellman, Judicial Abdication of
Military Tort Accountability: But Who is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597 (1989).
63. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
64. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
65. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
66. Kellman, supra note 62, at 1600.
67. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
68. Kellman, supra note 62, at 1617.
69. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83.
70. Id. at 709.
71. Id. at 687.
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suggests that the Court will no longer ask the military to answer some of the
most basic questions of administrative law including whether it claimed
statutory or executive authority to implement a program, whether individual
decisionmakers had the appropriately delegated authority, and whether the
actual implementation complied with a program's basic plan.72 The Court's
willingness to exempt the military from any obligation to provide answers, let
alone proof, as a defense against tort claims is a complete abdication of judicial
review power similar to that in Goldman v. Weinberger where constitutional
challenges against the military were at issue.
B. Criticism of Current Doctrine
One of the oldest and most grievous cautions against military deference is
found in Korematsu v. United States,73 perhaps the most infamous case of
judicial deference to military judgment, and one which is often invoked as a
warning against such deference.74 In Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld
the relocation and internment of 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in
deference to the "professional judgment" of military officials, the President,
the War Department, and the Congress that the move was necessary for
national security.75 In the half-century since the internment, Korematsu's
conviction for failure to cooperate with military authorities has been
overturned76 and Congress has apologized to those interned and provided
restitution to them.77 At the same time, the doctrine of deference to military
necessity has grown stronger.
The courts' increasing deference to military decisionmaking has not gone
unchallenged. In Brown v. Glines, Justice Brennan led the dissenters,
protesting that the "Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard free
72. See Kellman, supra note 62, at 1623.
73. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
74. See Karst, supra note 6, at 568-59; Kellman, supra note 62, at 1601-02. The dangers evident in
Korematsu were best articulated by Judge Patel:
As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military
necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a
caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not
be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a
caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative,
executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from
the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Korematsu I1).
75. For a more complete discussion of the decision, including the degree to which racism influenced
the judgments of decisionmakers, see Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE
L.J. 489 (1945); FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962); ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF
PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE
EXCLUSION (1962); MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE
EVACUATION (1949); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (1983).
76. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Korematsu I).
77. Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§§ 1989-1989d (West Supp. 1989).
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expression when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military
necessity."" One commentator has suggested that the nation's "strength
grows from the resolve to subject military force to constitutional authority .
. . ." Resisting an interpretation of Goldman that would force courts to
forego on-the-merits review of military policies," the Ninth Circuit recently
remanded a case concerning the discharge of a lesbian Army Reserve officer,
demanding that the district court make a decision on the merits rather than
invoke stock phrases that courts must defer to military decisions about the
matter. 1 In Pruitt, the court was particularly concerned that the Army had
"submitted no evidence justifying its regulation," and that the plaintiff had had
no opportunity to rebut the Army's position.82 The court acknowledged
precedents demanding deference to the military, however it cautioned against
employing deference to the extent of denying all reviewability.5 3
While many commentators warn of the dangers of allowing the military
to escape judicial review altogether, many argue only for getting to the merits
stage in suits against the military and say little or nothing about the degree of
deference the courts should apply when reviewing the merits of a case. Some
critics explicitly qualify their arguments by suggesting courts show significant
deference to military decisions once the merits of a claim are reached." For
example, in Goldman v. Weinberger, Justice O'Connor objected to the
majority's failure to reach the merits of Goldman's claim. She proposed instead
that the military's interests should be incorporated into the assignment of the
level of governmental interest in the challenged policy and taken into account
at the balancing stage of the analysis. Justice O'Connor claimed that such a
test would be "sufficiently flexible to take into account the special importance
of defending our Nation without abandoning completely the freedoms that make
it worth defending. "85
78. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in extending "absolute land] uncritical
deference," the majority "eschew[ed] its constitutionally mandated role" ofjudicial review in cases asserting
governmental violations of fundamental constitutional rights).
79. Kellman, supra note 62, at 1597.
80. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
81. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 166-67 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3413 (U.S.
Dec. 8, 1992) (No. 92-389).
82. Id. at 1165.
83. Id. at 1166 (citations omitted). See also Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d at 1350 n.31
("Goldman and Rostker require judicial deference, not the abdication of our Article III duty to hold the
other branches of government, even the military, accountable to the Constitution.").
84. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 17, at 103 ("[lI]t is not the fact of the invocation of the deference
policy which is problematic in Goldman, but the degree to which that policy was implemented."); Kellman,
supra note 62, at 1649 ("[It is hard to disagree that the judiciary should be deferential about the need for
weaponry, the best method of testing and developing such weaponry, or the allocation of risks associated
with such weaponry"); Sugin, supra note 6, at 889 (standard proposed in Note "would allow the military
to pursue an . . . unfettered policy in wartime combat"); Gorenstein, supra note 33, at 389, passim
(accepting "lesser scope in the military sphere" of many rights and criticizing holdings of military deference
cases for finding non-justiciability, not because of their substantive outcomes).
85. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 530-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Donahue, supra note 17, at
107-09 (supporting O'Connor's dissent in Goldman).
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Perhaps commentators focus on justiciability because it seems an achievable
improvement in the current state of doctrine. It is certainly a minimum
necessary requirement-if courts demand an explanation from the military,
it is at least possible that they may find a particular explanation unconvincing.
But the holdings of cases prior to Goldman, in which the Court reached the
merits and yet deferred to military decisionmakers, show that application of
a balancing test that is unduly deferential to the military may not be sufficient.
Whether through balancing or nonreviewability, denial of a military member's
claim constitutes an identical infringement of that citizen's interests.
C. The "Separate Sphere" Defense of Deference
A strong theme running throughout the deference cases is the claim that
the armed forces constitute a "separate community" where significant
constraints on individual liberty are justified.8 7 One commentator who
supports a doctrine of deference based on a separate-community description
of the military, posits four propositions underlying the doctrine:
First, as a matter of observation and history, the armed forces are a
distinct subculture in which the individual is subordinated to the
organization in a manner unlike any other government activity. Second,
the existence of this peculiar relationship is evidence that it rationally
serves both the armed forces' internal purposes and the larger society's
interests. Third, when individual rights appear to conflict with the
smooth working of the armed forces, the Court distrusts its own ability
to reconcile them without harming military effectiveness. Fourth, its
exceptional reluctance to intervene on behalf of judicially developed
individual rights is justified because the purpose of the armed forces,
"to fight wars," is fundamentally different from any other government
activity."8
Professor Hirschhorn criticizes both the majority on the Court and its critics
for failing to address the relationship between the courts and the military on
a fundamental, functional level.8 9 In deference cases, Hirschhorn argues, the
fact "that military personnel do not enjoy the same rights as civilians is
advanced as a reason why they should not."" The absence of reasoned
justification, Hirschhorn complains, makes assertions of military necessity and
86. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the military should "provide,
as an initial matter and at a minimum, a credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely to
interfere with the proffered military interest.").
87. Hirschhorn, supra note 27, at 178 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 201-02.
89. Id. at 179-180.
90. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
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of the separate community "vulnerable to criticism."91
In his article, Hirschhorn articulates a justification for deference based on
the nation's constitutional system and on problems of authority within the
military and between military and civilian powers.92 Hirschhorn argues that
because "the primary purposes for which the armed forces exist, the successful
use or threat of force against other sovereigns, is outside the constitutional
system .. . the courts . ..have no basis on which to decide that a military
practice which rationally furthers that purpose is less important than its cost
to servicemen's liberty interests. " Hirschhorn faces squarely the implications
of the separate sphere defense of military deference:
The result is an approach to judicial review that accepts the segregation
of a relatively limited class of persons from the constitutional norms
of civilian society. It accepts that the 'separate community' is one in
which . . . individuals exist not as ends in themselves but as means to
their superiors' ends.94
He defends his position through a lesser-evil argument that accepts sacrifice
of the rights of many for the good of the nation.
Hirschhorn criticizes those opposed to military deference for their failure
to understand that a self-contained military culture is crucial for military
effectiveness.95 Indeed, critics of the separate sphere defense have tended to
attack as inaccurate the description of the military as a separate sphere.
Commentators have criticized the majority on the Court for relying "upon an
arguably outmoded appraisal of the military. "96 Professor Karst, for example,
has written that because the nation has moved to a large, peacetime military
made up of volunteers, the armed forces are no longer seen as a separate
community but rather as "just another job."97
Rather than challenge Hirschhorn's description of the military as a unique
entity, this article explores the issue of military deference on the terms set
forth by Hirschhorn and by the current majority of the Court. It criticizes
military deference based on concerns arising from the military's position as
a separate sphere within the United States' constitutional system. Concerns
about the military's unique place within and effect on the nation's democracy
were central to the republican philosophies that influenced our nation's
founders, but have been largely ignored by current critics of judicial deference.
91. Id. at 204.
92. See id. at 180.
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. at 252.
96. Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity:
Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 (1976). See also Hirschhorn, supra
note 27, at 204-06.
97. Karst, supra note 6, at 571 (citations omitted).
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This article seeks to revive attention to these concerns while taking seriously
the nation's need for a disciplined, effective fighting force.
III. THE DANGEROUSNESS OF "THE SEPARATE SPHERE"
The most salient feature of a military force is its control of a tremendous
store of weaponry. In addition, a "standing army," as opposed to a "militia"
of part-time citizen-soldiers, exists in times of peace as well as war and is
populated to a large degree by professional officers and soldiers-the career
military. Our nation's founders feared the potential power of a standing army
for reasons that are as valid today as they were then.
In order to understand the founders' wariness of the armed force, it is
necessary to place their discussion of military concerns in the political context
of the time, an era that was heavily influenced by a civic republican conception
of politics. This section first describes civic republicanism as it was understood
by the framers of the Constitution, and as it has since been explored in relation
to modern social and political culture. It then discusses the dangers identified
by the nation's founders in establishing a professional armed force and
describes the advantages of the type of military they would have preferred: the
citizen militia. The section concludes by suggesting that general civic
republican commitments, including the ideal of a citizen militia, provide an
appropriate standard for evaluating the wisdom or potential danger of current
military policies.
A. Civic Republicanism
In recent years, constitutional theorists have rediscovered and revived the
"civic republican" conception of politics and society.98 These "neo-
republicans" have enriched our understandings of the contours and influence
of republican thought by researching the influence of civic republicanism on
the formation of the United States Constitution and by exploring the possible
application of republican ideals to law and politics in the modern United States.
Early republicans conceived of politics as a project in which citizens come
together to decide matters of policy "united in their commitment to good faith
pursuit of their common good. "" Civic republicanism emphasizes the process
98. A democracy may take many different forms and elevate many different ideals. Modern proponents
of republican democracy often contrast the republican ideal of democracy with libertarian or individualistic
ideals of democracy or with "understandings [of democracy] that treat governmental outcomes as a kind
of interest-group deal, and that downplay the deliberative functions of politics and the social formation of
preferences." Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1590 (1988).
99. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-41 (1986)
(citing J. Pocock, Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND
TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80, 87-89 (1973); J. Pocock, Machiavelli,
Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME:
ESSAYS ON PoLmcAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 131-32 (1973)).
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of self-government rather than particular outcomes of this process. This
political paradigm views people as social and political beings whose self
development depends on coming together with other citizens as coequals to
decide matters of common concern.'00
Stressing political deliberation among citizens, republicanism demands that
citizens engage in political interaction, and listen to and learn from one
another."' 1 It demands that when a society makes laws, it takes into account
the concerns of all its citizens rather than the self-interest of only a segment
of society' 02-"that political actors . . . look through the eyes of all those
affected."103 Professor Brest calls the republican process "discursive
participation-participation that induces us to listen to other people's positions
and justify our own." " Professor Michelman calls it "deliberative
politics "-"an argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each
other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect."a"
Reaching agreement on common affairs was much easier in the small, early
republics where the citizenry, for political purposes, included only landholding
white men. Neo-republican theorists have sought to overcome the elitist history
of republicanism and the difficulty of applying republican ideals to the modern,
heterogeneous United States. They argue that deliberative politics does not
require "dissolution of difference, but conciliation within reason"" 6 of the
diverse perspectives of a pluralist body politic.
The possibility of invoking republican ideals to promote a politics of
inclusion in the United States is perhaps best explored in the work of political
theorist Iris Young. According to Young, a heterogeneous population may still
engage in republican interaction if differences are recognized, accepted and
mutually respected.'07 Failure to recognize and affirm differences in society
makes the true participatory democracy envisioned by republicans impossible.
Young argues that such failure results in identification of needs and imposition
of norms that appear to be neutral and universal, but instead serve those of the
privileged groups who seek to deny the existence of differences in society. 08
Instead of insisting on false homogeneity, "participatory democracy must
promote the ideal of a heterogeneous public, in which persons stand forth with
their differences acknowledged and respected, though perhaps not completely
100. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman,
Law's Republic]; Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623 (1988); Michelman, supra note 99, at 47.
101. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1549.
102. Id. at 1550.
103. Id. at 1589.
104. Brest, supra note 100, at 1624 (quoting Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 1, 194 (1986)).
105. Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 447 (1989).
106. Id. at 448.
107. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 163 (1990).
108. See id. at 165.
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understood, by others. " "
Young describes the kind of participatory politics toward which a pluralistic
society should aim as a "communicative democracy."" x Like deliberative
republican politics, communicative democracy requires citizens to come
together in good faith to discuss their collective ends and the best means to
achieve them."' Such a program requires that all voices be heard, that no
voice be silenced by physical, economic, or political means or the "more subtle
force that silences those who give reasons or make pleas of the 'wrong'
form. "112 But communicative democracy, as distinct from traditional
republican deliberative democracy, "assumes a starting point of distance and
difference, that participants in communicative interaction must reach out to one
another to forestall or overcome misunderstanding. " "'
Communicative democracy not only accepts differences among members
of a public, it embraces them as necessary and desirable. By bringing differing
perspectives and commitments to political and social discussion, participants
are forced to identify the polity's full range of needs and will "aim at the result
that is the most just, as the one that all can agree to as most fairly
accommodating the needs and interests of everyone."14 Exposure to the
experiences and styles of fellow citizens is important to this process because
assumptions made on a subconscious level affect the judgments people make
about whether policies or laws are necessary or appropriate."' Engagement
with the broad range of a diverse citizenry is a prerequisite to overcoming
assumptions that are based on "fears, aversions, and devaluations of groups
marked as different.""
6
The importance of engaging with one's fellow citizens lies not only in its
potential for strengthening the political decisionmaking process. Civic
republicans also believe that individual self-development depends on
participatory politics for its full expression." 7 The process of engaging in
participatory, communicative politics not only lets a citizen reshape the
attitudes and preferences of those around her, but she herself may be
transformed in the process:
109. Id. at 119.
110. See Iris M. Young, Justice and Communicative Democracy, in RADICAL PHILOSOPHY:
TRADITION, COUNTER-TRADITION, POLITICS (Roger Gottlieb ed., forthcoming 1993) (manuscript on file
with author).
111. See id. (manuscript at 11-12).
112. Id. at 9 (citing Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 (1990)).
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id. at 13.
115. See YOUNG, supra note 107, at 134.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 105, at 450. Tracing its roots back to Aristotelean political
theory, this aspect of traditional civic republicanism blends easily with postmodern and feminist conceptions
of human development as contingent and socially determined.
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By having to speak and justify his or her preferences to others who
may be skeptical, a person becomes more reflective about these
preferences, accommodates them to the preferences of others, or
sometimes becomes even more convinced of the legitimacy of his or
her claims. By listening to others and trying to understand their
experience and claims, persons or groups gain broader knowledge of
the social relations in which they are embedded, and of the implications
of their proposals. These circumstances of a mutual requirement of
openness to persuasion often transform the motives, opinions and
preferences of the participants."'
To republican theorists, citizenship and participation in politics "is also a
vehicle for the inculcation of such characteristics as empathy, virtue, and
feelings of community."'9
Civic republicans emphasize the importance of providing "outlets for the
exercise of citizenship" 20 within society because citizens must learn to
govern themselves, a task taught only by the exercise of democratic
participation: "[o] nly such participation... can give persons a sense of active
relation to social institutions and processes, a sense that social relations are
not natural but subject to intervention and change. The virtues of citizenship
are best cultivated through the exercise of citizenship."12 The fora in which
citizens gain such experience include every aspect of their communal lives
from schools and social clubs to workplaces and street life.' A republican
citizen who is disabled from participating in decisionmaking on a daily level
and who "live[s] in a 'condition of unalterable subordination during much of
his life, [cannot] acquire the habits of responsible choice and self-government
which political democracy calls for.'""
Taken together, republican ideals suggest several conditions for
maintenance of a healthy democracy and citizenry: First, interaction, dialogue,
and debate must form the center of political decisionmaking. Second,
controlling influences such as coercion or extreme dependence that prevent
individuals from participating in good faith in the process of governance must
118. Young, supra note 110, (manuscript at 12-13).
119. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1556 (citing C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1970)).
120. Id. at 1556.
121. YOUNG, supra note 107, at 92.
122. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 100, at 1531. See also Brest, supra note 100, at 1624-25
("Political discourse ... may take place in connection with paradigmatic political activities such as lobbying
or voting; or as part of 'direct action' such as a labor strike or a civil rights sit-in; or it may consist simply
of talk among citizens.").
123. Brest, supra note 100, at 1626 (quoting T. B. Bottomore, The Insufficiency of Elite Competition,
in FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 127, 135 (H. Kariel ed. 1970)). Brest also notes, "John Stuart
Mill spoke of the meaninglessness of a 'political act to be done only once in a few years, and for which
nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him.'" Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS
ON POLrriCS AND CULTURE 229 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1962)).
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be eliminated so that the opinions and needs voiced in the dialogue are those
of the participants, not those who control them. Third, voices of the broadest
possible range of persons in society must be heard in interactions of all kinds
to expose everyone to the opinions and needs of others. Only through such
exposure are opinions revised, assumptions and commitments challenged.
B. The Corruption of Standing Armies and the Militia Ideal
Because the republican conception of society and politics depends on
coming together in good faith to learn from one another and to reach decisions
for the common good, "corruption" of citizens, and thereby of the nation as
a whole, was an ever-present danger to republicans: "Corruption is the
subversion, within the political motivation of any participant, of the general
good by particular interest. By extension, corruption is also a participant's
material dependence upon another's will . . .124
Among the corrupting influences feared by early republicans was a standing
army."~ Alexander Hamilton addressed and echoed the fears of many at the
nation's founding that provision of a federal standing army would constitute
a direct danger to democracy and civilian government:
On the smallest scale [a standing army] has its inconveniences. On an
extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an
object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation...
whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may
become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing
. . . the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its
liberties. 126
A standing army presented several potential dangers: first, having been
entrusted with the nation's instruments of coercive power, an army might
overthrow the government and the democracy; second, through express or
implied threat of such overthrow, a standing army might indirectly control the
state, inducing lawmakers to legislate in a manner calculated to mollify military
interests; third, those in the military might corrupt democracy by intimidating
non-military citizens; and finally, a standing army threatens to corrupt those
in the military themselves because of their reliance on the military for their
salary, career advancement, and professional and personal prestige.
In a standing army, the prestige of the military as an institution rises and
falls according to the degree to which the nation relies or focuses on the
124. Michelman, supra note 99, at 40.
125. For an extensive discussion of the history and philosophy behind such fears, see David C.
Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
551, 572-86 (1991).
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 257-58 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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military. In times of war or armed conflict, all eyes are on the military. Its
prestige, and that of its members, is heightened. Combat becomes a proving
ground for the professional soldier, a key part of his career development and
self-image.'" This results in the perverse situation that those charged with
the defense of the nation have an interest in assuring that the nation is
constantly or at least repeatedly threatened. As a consequence, there is a
danger that the military will push for foreign policy decisions that rely on
military force, a move that also raises the specter of the nation slipping into
direct military rule. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out two centuries ago,
when a nation is continually threatened with external invasion,
[t]he continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of
the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.
The military state becomes elevated above the civil ... and by degrees
the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their
protectors but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition
to that of considering them masters is neither remote nor difficult. '2 8
When the military is a standing army, its members also have an interest
in assuring that the military as an institution reserves for itself the highest
degree of power and autonomy possible within the government and
society. 129 Not surprisingly, such a military might argue that it should not
be accountable to civilian courts of law or even to civilian politicians. While
the military might respect the President as Commander in Chief, or
Congressmembers as those with the power to create or alter military law, it
would also not be surprising that professional officers would seek to sway the
commands and policies of the political branches by arguing for special
treatment because of special "military necessities" only they understand.
Civic republicans also feared the corrupting effect of military life on
citizens who chose a military career. They believed that "soldierhood and
citizenship fostered inconsistent values as the one insisted on slavish obedience
and the other fostered independent judgment."' 3 0 Citizens conditioned to obey
rather than to think for themselves would be hampered from participating as
equals in political discussions regarding the common good, and their self-
development through political participation would suffer.
Civic republicans contrasted the dangers of a standing army with the
advantages of a citizen militia. A citizen militia is composed of the citizenry
as a whole, each of whom, by turns, serves in the military in addition to
maintaining a civilian trade. Although he urged the formation of a federal
127. In contrast, the citizen-soldier with another profession spends only a brief time in military service
and relies on civilian pursuits for material, social, and psychological sustenance.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
129. See Williams, supra note 125, at 573-74.
130. Id. at 601 n.275 (citations omitted).
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standing army, Hamilton recognized that a citizen militia posed fewer dangers
to the state and its citizens:
Where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?
What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling
with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the
same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?'
Samuel Adams agreed: "The Militia is composed of free Citizens. There is
therefore no Danger of their making use of their Power to the destruction of
their own Rights, or suffering others to invade them."132 By including all
citizens in its ranks, a militia was thought to be less dangerous than a standing
army because it would work for the common good.'33 Furthermore, because
a citizen militia incorporates more citizens than a professional military, more
citizens would want to voice their opinions about the content of military
regulations, the formation of foreign policy, and other matters of national
defense.
Despite their fears of a standing army, the founders acknowledged the
advantages of a professional armed force. Hamilton, for example, argued that
the practice, expertise, and experience needed for a strong military were too
difficult to achieve in a citizen militia. Attempts to achieve the necessary level
of proficiency by citizens only drained energy and resources from their full-
time trades. "' Conditions of modern warfare, with the technical complexity
of most modern weaponry and equipment, make reliance on a standing army
inevitable. They also, however, make such reliance more dangerous. Thus,
despite accepting the existence of a standing army, the nation should continue
to heed warnings about its dangers.
The central challenge in making decisions concerning the military is to
ensure continued civilian control over the military and to lessen its potentially
corrupting influence on citizens and politics while maintaining an effective
fighting force. A key to finding this balance in scrutinizing military policies
may be invocation of what Professor Williams has called the "militia
ideal."' 35 The militia ideal draws on republican commitment to a universal
militia of citizen-soldiers and emphasizes the importance of widespread citizen
participation in and power over their government and its institutions. Professor
Williams finds constitutional underpinnings for use by modern courts of the
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
132. Williams, supra note 125, at 578 (citing 3 SAMUEL ADAMS, WRITINGS 251 (Henry A. Cushing,
ed., 1906)).
133. Id. Of course, universal service of free citizens meant that the militia would be composed of white
males. Abolition of slavery and the extension of the vote to people of color and women implies that a
modem militia, to be "universal," ought to include all citizens.
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 184-85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
135. Williams, supra note 125, at 554.
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militia ideal in the Second Amendment,' 36 which evidences the concern of
the founders that power remain with the people rather than being completely
usurped by a standing military." 7 He argues that the absence of a true citizen
militia in the nation
should create a heightened constitutional suspicion of the standing army
and the police. Those bodies have, in a sense, usurped the militia's
control of the means of force, and they have systematic interests in
making their hold more effective at the expense of the liberties of the
people ....
This suspicion should be at its height when the standing army and
the police come into contact with the general populace and seek to
restrict citizens' control over their own lives. For example, the
Supreme Court should not have deferred to the military's claims of
necessity in the Japanese-American internment cases.""
The republican concerns that gave rise to the Second Amendment and the
militia ideal suggest that heightened scrutiny of the nation's professional armed
forces is appropriate not only with regard to military decisions that directly
touch the civilian population, but also those that affect servicepersons, and
thereby indirectly affect the citizenry and the nation's democratic system.
In addition to scrutiny based on the militia ideal, the standards of
communicative politics provide a conceptual framework for evaluating the
composition, policies, and practices of the modern standing army of the United
States. The social and political prerequisites for communicative democracy are
calculated to maintain and strengthen participatory democracy. Republican
ideals of communicative politics explain how and why policies that isolate
segments of the citizenry from one another or that stifle political interaction
are destructive to democracy. Looking at the military through the lens of the
militia ideal and neo-republican conceptions of democracy reveals the degree
to which policies within the military that have such an effect are destructive
to servicepersons and dangerous to the maintenance of democracy in a
heterogeneous society. The standard set by civic-republican ideals suggests that
precisely because of the unique, separate role played by the armed forces in
a democratic society, courts should insist on a military that approximates to
the greatest degree possible a universal citizen militia.
IV. REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE MODERN MILITIA
Applying the lessons and warnings outlined above to the problem of judicial
136. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
137. Williams, supra note 125, at 553-54, 606.
138. Id. at 601.
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deference suggests that courts should be wary of self-interested rule-making
and advice by military decisionmakers, of military policies restricting service
by certain segments of the larger population, and of regulations tending to
suppress servicepersons' involvement as citizens in the political and social life
of the nation. But modern judicial deference to military judgments has opened
the door to precisely the kind of dangers civic republicans fear. Courts have
allowed exclusion of segments of society from full participation in the armed
services and strict control of the expressive political activities of military
members. This section argues that such practices ignore the degree to which
self-interest motivates the policies and recommendations developed by military
experts, allow inculcation of attitudes among military personnel that
significantly reduce the possibility of developing a politics of communicative
self-government in the nation, and promote discrimination and subordination
within the military and in society as a whole.
A. Expertise Versus Corruption
The modern United States' military is populated by significant numbers of
career officers and enlisted persons and is supported by half of the nation's
budget. Those who question military decisions or argue against special
deference to the armed forces are often told that they do not understand the
military. But civic republicanism cautions against accepting too readily the
advice of military experts.
By invoking its expertise and delegitimizing its critics, the military ensures
that those most influential on military policy have spent a great deal of time
in the armed forces. Those making decisions about the military are likely to
be service-academy trained, and of middle- to upper-income background. They
are also likely to come from backgrounds that aggrandize the military forces,
and that view a career as a professional military officer as superior to all
others. They will have been steeped in military culture during their formative
years. If trained in service academies, they will have had little contact with
a racially diverse population or with women as peers or as leaders and will
have learned the military's official version of history and politics. 1
39
Furthermore, when military decisionmakers are asked for advice on how
military members ought to be treated, courts essentially ask those giving the
139. Military training is central to the service academies. See US Air Force Academy, AIR FORCE
MAGAZINE, May 1991, at 132. The military, because it controls the curriculum, controls what future
officers learn about the military. For example, at West Point, there is no required course on the Vietnam
War. Only one elective, "Korea, Vietnam and the American Military Experience," discusses that chapter
of American military history and it does so by "cover[ing] the Indochinese conflict in seven lessons..
. . [1991's] primary text was written by... Gen. William Westmoreland's chief intelligence officer." See
Bill Turque, Erasing the Vietnam Nightmare, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 67. The academies are still
predominantly white, male institutions: in the Class of 1991, women comprised 9% of their class at the
Naval academy, 11% at West Point, and 15% at the Air Force academy, and minority group members
comprised only 15-16% of their class at each of the three service academies. See Richard Halloran, Military
Academies Are Becoming Even Tougher on Body and Mind, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1988, § 4, at 4.
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orders how they ought to be allowed to treat their subordinates. The question
military decisionmakers then ask themselves is not the civic-republican inquiry
"what laws shall we in this institution give to ourselves" but rather the self-
interested, corruption-inducing question "how much power shall we, the ruling
class in this institution, be allowed to have?"
Civilians who gain the status of the title "military expert" tend to depend
on military decisionmakers for their employment or economic gain. For
example, there is a well-known "revolving door" between employment in the
defense industry and the Pentagon or Defense Department. "° Secretary of
Defense Carlucci insisted that those involved in procurement for the military
be "'under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of
defense.'"' 4 ' The Pentagon spends $2.2 billion to $3.9 billion a year hiring
consultants, and defense firms pay as much as $1,000 a day for help in
obtaining defense contracts. One of these consulting firms is "known as 'rent-
a-general' because its principals are retired military officers with the rank of
admiral or general ... "142
These "military experts" have all been socialized in the military's
traditional ways of functioning. 43 Maintenance of their preferences, power,
or fortunes depends on securing greater power for the military. Because of
their dependence on the military and their particularized interest in political
or judicial outcomes regarding the military, the advice of these experts with
regard to military affairs is, in republican terms, corrupt.'44
One might argue that it is nevertheless appropriate and desirable to entrust
specialized matters to subsections of society who are experts in the area. 45
The advantage and necessity of the standing army is, after all, that it permits
levels of experience, knowledge and ability that are not obtainable with a
140. See, e.g., Barbara Boxer, Lessonsfrom the Pentagon Procurement Scandal, CHRISTIAN ScIENcE
MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1988, at 12.
141. Id.
142. Ralph Frammolino and Carla Lazzareschi, Lawmakers Seek Controls on 'Shadowy' Consultants,
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at 1. Recent moves to limit access of military officials to secret documents
or to reduce their influence over decisions of national security affecting the defense industry have been
successfully fought by "veterans organizations, and former generals and admirals-including some of the
most valued consultants and contractors in the defense industry." Melissa Healy, Shifts in Defense Policy
Tied to Pressure, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1988, at 1.
143. Sugin, supra note 6, at 889 n.253 (quoting Hirschhorn, supra note 27, at 228) ("[Sltudies have
shown that '[t]he armed forces are not always rational; superiors frequently develop emotional attachment
to military practices that do not enhance efficiency but do alienate the men subject to them.'")).
144. See supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text. In addition to the traditional republican
corruption of dependency and self-interested decisionmaking, current and former military officials have
been implicated in corrupt activities in the modem sense of the word, such as fraud and bribery in
procurement decisions. See also Healy, supra note 142.
145. Cf. Andrew Fraser, Beyond the Charter Debate: Republicanism, Rights and Civic Virtue in the
Civil Constitution of Canadian Society, 1 REV. CONST. STUD./REv. ETUDE CONST. (1992) (formerly
ALBERTA L. REV.) (proposing that Canadian society delegate a significant share of constitutional
decisionmaking power to the bar, because lawyers' training and expertise lend them the professional virtue
(telos) to carry out such responsibilities). I owe development of this subsection to questions posed by
Professor Michelman in light of the suggestions contained in Professor Fraser's article.
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citizen militia.'" But the negative side to group expertise is group
particularism. Military experts are likely to formulate and explain decisions
concerning the armed forces in a manner that is infused with military culture
as they know it. Such decisions may be presented to civilians, including the
judiciary, in a manner so intertwined with that culture that particular care must
be taken to reframe the issues and their solutions by reference to broader social
or constitutional considerations.
Furthermore, allowing military experts to decide the constitutionality of
military policies is problematic and dangerous. It leaves such decisions to
people who are expert in fighting or administering the armed forces, but are
not experts with regard to democratic principles, constitutionalism, or the
degree of power the military may appropriately reserve to itself in a
constitutional system such as ours that depends for its survival on a complex
web of checks and balances.
The dynamics of decisionmaking by military experts point toward the
corruption feared by early republicans: it is decisionmaking by a select
subsection of the citizenry, isolated from the range of concerns and interests
shaping the broader population. Furthermore, it is decisionmaking that places
the military and its needs as an institution in the center of the calculus and fails
to consider the common good of the nation as a whole. Even if some military
officers are capable of avoiding the temptations of power, the fact that some
may show restraint is not the test. A society that wishes its democracy to
survive must be wary of the advice of those who control military resources
and avoid establishing structures such as a doctrine of judicial deference that
may tempt decisionmakers to turn military policies to their own advantage.'47
B. Restrictions on Political Activities
The ideals of communicative politics and the exercise and development of
habits of democracy 4 ' call into question the wisdom of judicial deference
to military policies that limit servicepersons' political speech.'49 Military
commanders and recruiters motivate citizens to risk their lives or endure
hardship through appeals to patriotism and protection of democracy. Ironically,
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our Nation
has preserved freedom of religion, not through trusting to the good faith of individual agencies of
government alone, but through the constitutionally mandated vigilant oversight and checking authority of
the judiciary.").
148. See supra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
149. Constitutionally speaking, concerns regarding freedom of political expression and freedom of
religious expression are closely intertwined. However, in the military context, religious expression is
primarily limited through dress-code policies that effectively exclude members of certain religious groups
from military service. See supra notes 31-37, 61 and accompanying text. Civic republican criticism of
Goldman v. Weinberger is better grounded in arguments analogous to those set forth in Section IV.C., infra,
on exclusion of women, gay men, and lesbians than arguments in this section which concentrate on
suppression of political activities.
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this patriotism is then mixed in the military environment with absolute
deference to authority, absence of dissent, and prior restraint on political
gatherings or communications. 15 0 This powerful combination is presented to
young people in their formative, first years away from home. In this context,
the "Democracy" that the United States stands for, the democracy they are
charged with protecting, is more mythical than real. It would come as no
surprise if those socialized in such an environment came to associate patriotism
and democracy with blind flag-waving and a willingness to "Fight for
America" without consideration and discussion of the goals or means of
military activities.
In a republican democracy, all citizens are ideally politically-engaged
members of the polis. This ideal is more readily attained by servicepersons in
a militia than those in a standing army. Citizen-soldiers who come together
temporarily to train or fight in the nation's defense circulate in and out of the
military, bringing their opinions from civilian life to their military service.
Their military experience likewise shapes their contributions to debates about
military needs, treatment of servicemembers, and the like. Everyone sees
herself as potentially in need of protection by the military, as potentially called
upon to guard the country, and as potentially subject to military regulations.
In the modern volunteer military, however, where universal service of
citizens is neither demanded nor allowed, some serve in the military for several
years while many others spend no time at all in military service, hampering
the circulation and dialogue that might help to keep military policies in check.
If military personnel are allowed to vote but are constrained in their ability to
communicate with their colleagues, fellow community members, or political
representatives, 5 they are effectively excluded from meaningful political
participation. Civilians, on the other hand, do not care to familiarize
themselves with conditions in the military because they will never be directly
affected by military law. These developments represent a serious breakdown
of communicative politics.152 Predictably, under such conditions, the
populace will rely on military decisionmakers' "expert" opinions: on what
other information are people to rely?
The implications of this state of affairs are particularly disturbing when the
standing army is an all-volunteer force that attracts a disproportionate number
of its members from lower-income groups and racial minorities, groups still
by and large excluded from political decisionmaking in society as a whole.'
150. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
153. The difference class and race make in decisions about the appropriateness of particular military
engagements has been noted in conflicts throughout the last half century. African-Americans, who are
disproportionately represented among the poor in this country and who make up 20.6% of the armed forces,
have tended to be less supportive of the military campaigns of the United States armed forces. See Andrew
H. Malcolm, Confrontation in the Gulf: Opponents to U.S. Move Have Poverty in Common, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 8, 1990, at A6.
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The exclusion of certain groups from participation in the polis is disturbing
not only because of the effects of such exclusion on the democracy, but also
because of its effect on the excluded individuals. If engagement in the political
process is part of the essence of being human,' 54 military policies that forbid
military members from participating in collective political activity rob them
of their humanity.
C. Exclusion of Women, Gay Men, and Lesbians
Imagine yourself as an Army general who attended West Point before
women were admitted to the Academy. . . . From graduation to the
present, you have been socialized to the norms of the service. Those
norms promote the ideology of masculinity at every turn .... By the
time some judge certified you as an expert on military morale and
discipline, you had spent your whole professional life immersed in a
belief system that entirely excluded competing points of view on
manhood and the Army's mission.' 55
The military, of course, tends to produce homogenized individuals who
think-as well as march-in unison. 1
56
The military provides education and training for many of the nation's young
adults. The armed forces teach not only specific job skills, but self-discipline
and responsibility. The military prides itself on "teach[ing] by example."' 57
Many recruits enter the service at age eighteen and spend their first years away
from home in the military.' The self-images, attitudes, and habits learned
in the service filter into their later civilian lives. Where the military excludes
certain segments of the population from service, it teaches that such exclusion
is necessary and appropriate. 159 Under current policies of exclusion, recruits
learn that women and homosexuals are less than full citizens.
In addition to its educative function, the military is a "total institution" for
servicepersons: "The individual's relation to the military organization is
comprehensive since it is 'his employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver
154. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
155. Karst, supra note 6, at 576.
156. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 770 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. Karst, supra note 6, at 527.
158. Fifty percent of the men in the Army are between the ages of 17 and 24. Gender Discrimination,
1992: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel and Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation
of the House Armed Services Committee, July 30, 1992 (transcript available from Federal News Service)
[hereinafter Gender Discrimination Hearings]. The military recognizes and takes account of this dynamic
in developing its policies and programs. See, e.g., Gender Discrimination Hearings (statement of Admiral
Frank B. Kelso, III, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy) ("[Wie have a great responsibility to the young
people that come into our services and to their parents to ensure that they're taught the right things in life
and live the right kind of life.")
159. See Karst, supra note 6, at 527-28.
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in one.'" 1" If military personnel do not come into contact with women, gay
men, or lesbians in the course of their duties, they are unlikely to encounter
them at all. The consequent lack of contact, discussion, and common mission
deprives servicepersons of the ability to engage in communicative interaction
with such citizens. Thus exclusion within the armed forces results in a military
sphere marked by a nearly complete lack of dialogic interaction on issues of
gender and sexual orientation. The opinions of military "experts" become
tainted by the prejudices inculcated in an isolated atmosphere and their
stereotypes and attitudes regarding the excluded Other161 are never
challenged.
Decisions about exclusion should be subject to special scrutiny because they
may be motivated by concerns unrelated to military necessity. The military
decisionmaker's self-image may be at stake: "For many men who have
invested their lives in a career that places so high a value on [the] pursuit [of
manhood], suggestions that seem to undermine the ideology of masculinity are
deeply threatening."162 Such attitudes will change only when heterosexual
military men live and work side by side with women and with openly gay men
and women in all areas of service. But only non-military authorities may
possess the will to create the conditions for such interaction. Military women
have commented on the unwillingness of the "old guard" generation, the men
highest on the military's chain of command, to address problems of sexism in
the armed forces. 163 Given the entrenched sexism and homophobia in our
armed forces, military decisionmakers may never voluntarily change their
policies of exclusion. When the Court defers to the opinions of decisionmakers
steeped in a culture of heterosexual masculinity, it ignores the possibility that
judgments cloaked in terms of national security may be motivated by mere
personal preference.1 "
Ironically, this deference has increased even as recent events have led to
forthright admissions by top military leaders that their attitudes about women
in the military are based on personal preferences rather than military need. For
example, General Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, testified
before a Congressional panel that he would choose a male pilot over a female
pilot with superior qualifications, even though it did not make sense, because
"That's the way I feel."1 6' He admitted that the combat exclusion is
discriminatory, that it works to the disadvantage of women, and that he
"couldn't think of a logical reason-a logical argument for defending a policy
160. Hirschhorn, supra note 27, at 189 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974)), 224.
161. For an interesting and provocative discussion of the function served in society by identifying and
excluding an "Other," see Carrie G. Costello, Legitimate Bonds and Unnatural Unions: Race, Sexual
Orientation, and Control of the American Family, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1992).
162. Karst, supra note 6, at 576. See also STIEHM, supra note 41, at 226.
163. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Conduct Unbecoming (Educational Broadcasting & GWETA,
July 1, 1992) [hereinafter MacNeil/Lehrer, Conduct Unbecoming].
164. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 35, 59 and accompanying text.
165. Jamie Ann Conway, Let Women Fly In Combat, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1992, at A31.
[Vol. 5: 1
Countenancing Corruption
of excluding women from combat assignments. "'s Nevertheless, he asserted
that he has a "very traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters
being ordered to kill people."167 General Carl E. Mundy, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, concurred with General McPeak:
when you get right down to it . combat is killing. Combat in the
sense that we usually associate with the direct combat role is looking
another human being in the eye and killing him. And it's not a pleasant
job. And often times it's not done with a precision guided munition,
... it sometimes is done with your hands, its done with a shovel, and
it's done at close range. And it's not-it's not good. It's debasing. And
it's something that I would not want to see women involved in, and for
which, I do not believe-and I'm grateful that this is my
perception-that women are suited to do. 6 '
This personal aversion to women in combat is echoed by male veterans who
have served in all-male units, who justify exclusion of women by reference
to the lack of plumbing or private toilets in the field and to an unwillingness
by some to send their daughters into situations like those they encountered in
Vietnam. 1
69
Deference to warnings that an end to exclusion policies would threaten the
nation's safety also ignores historical reality. Whenever more bodies were
needed, as in World War II and after the move to the all-volunteer force in
the 1970s, the military altered its exclusion policies to allow women, gay men
and lesbians to serve.17 The most recent example of this occurred during
the Persian Gulf War. The military reportedly adopted a "stop loss policy"
which "suspended homosexual discharges among reserve units during the war,
and openly gay and lesbian soldiers were sent overseas. When the war ended,
the discharges resumed. "
171
The vicious cycle of prejudice generated by exclusion policies does more
than color the professional judgment of military decisionmakers. The exclusion
of women from combat jobs and complete exclusion of gay men and lesbians
from military service communicates to servicepersons at large that such
discrimination is acceptable." 7 When combat is held up as the ultimate
contribution and proving ground during military service, the message conveyed
by exclusion of women from combat is that women are not fully capable
166. Gender Discrimination Hearings, supra note 158.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Rowan Scarborough, Foxhole Privacy at Issue: Women-at-War Hearings Continue,
WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1992, at Al.
170. Karst, supra note 6, at 579.
171. Frances Grandy Taylor, Good Officers, But Banned From Duty: Gays Fight to Change Military
Policy, HARTFORD COuRAm', Aug. 28, 1992, at B3.
172. See Karst, supra note 6, at 557.
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members of the armed forces. This cannot help but lead male servicepersons
to hold women in lesser esteem than their male peers. Examples of disrespect
and abuse of women in the military are legion.
A 1988 study found that nearly two out of three military women surveyed
had experienced sexual harassment and that military women were fifty percent
more likely to be harassed than their civilian counterparts. 73 Five percent
of respondents reported actual or attempted rape or sexual assault during the
previous twelve months .17 A 1990 report by the Pentagon "described a
pervasive denigration of women in an atmosphere where policies aimed at
preventing abuse are frequently not enforced." 175 A 1992 Washington Post
investigative report of women serving on a Navy repair ship found widespread
harassment of and hostility toward women on the ship.
76
Lack of respect for female colleagues exploded into the public
consciousness in the Fall of 1991 with revelations that naval aviators at a
convention of the Tailhook Association had forced fellow officers and other
female guests to walk through a "gauntlet" of men who threw drinks on the
women, subjected them to verbal abuse, and sexually molested them." Soon
after the incident, a retired Navy official admitted that the Tailhook convention
in 1991 was "not an isolated incident. . . . [t]here's always a boys-will-be-boys
attitude . T"171 Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, one of the women who came
forward with complaints about the incident, stated that she was "attacked by
naval officers and marine officers that knew who I was and it was a sport to
them .... They wouldn't have done it to their sister ... But for them it was
a sport."
179
At the same time that the Tailhook incident was under investigation, female
veterans and enlisted women testified before a Senate panel that during their
careers they had been raped or sexually abused by fellow servicemembers, but
when they reported the incidents, they were not believed or the incidents were
minimized." s Army Reserve Specialist Jacqueline Ortiz testified that she had
complained to her superiors of being forcibly sodomized by her first sergeant
in Saudi Arabia while serving in the Gulf War. At first, her superiors doubted
her story. When she pursued the complaint, she was reprimanded for "sexual
impropriety. "181
Military women link their exclusion from combat to such abuse.
Commander Rosemary Mariner, U.S. Navy, explained, "if you cannot share
173. Sharon Shahid, Sexual Harassment in the Military, USA TODAY, May 27, 1992, at 9A.
174. Elaine Sciolino, Military Women Report Pattern of Sexual Abuse by Servicemen, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1992, at Al.
175. Id.
176. Laura Blumenfeld, Women's Navy Blues: Don't Rock the Boat, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1992,
at B1.
177. H. G. Reza, Women Accuse Navy Pilots of Harassment, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at B1.
178. Id.
179. MacNeil/Lehrer, Conduct Unbecoming, supra note 163.
180. Sciolino, supra note 174, at Al.
181. Id.; Letta Tayler, Operation Parity, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1992, at 6.
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the equal risks and hazards in arduous duty, then you are not equal. And if
the institution can discriminate against you, then it's not a big leap . . . to
decide that well, I can harass you and I can get away with it."182 This
explanation captures in practical terms the dynamic that may result from lack
of the "dialogic . . . encounter with others"' 83 to which civic republicans
are committed. Because Navy women cannot serve as combat aviators, male
aviators' preconceived notions about women escape the challenge that
communicative interaction with women as equals might bring. Although
nominally present, women in the Navy are not perceived to hold authority or
be supported by those in authority. As a result, their needs, opinions, and
welfare are not included in any calculation of the common good. Such
discounting of women's interests inevitably led to the Tailhook aviators'
perception that an assault on their female colleagues was an enjoyable group
event.
In the wake of the Tailhook incident and increasing Congressional and
public scrutiny of abuse of women within the military, military policymakers
themselves are recognizing the importance of ceding some control over military
matters to decisionmakers free from traditional military indoctrination and
independent of the military chain of command. "' Acting Secretary of the
Navy Sean O'Keefe announced in September, 1992, that in order to address
"a cultural problem which has allowed demeaning behavior and attitudes
toward women to exist within the Navy Department," he was placing a civilian
in the position of Commander of the Naval Investigative Service, a position
formerly held by one-star admirals. O'Keefe explained that "this civilian
director will be better able to investigate uniformed officials of any rank with
independence."' 5
Disrespect for women inculcated in the military environment not only
influences treatment of servicewomen, but impacts upon development of
communicative politics at all levels of civilian society. It would be surprising
if servicemen, and even civilian men who work in the military
environment,1 6 could simply discard attitudes that discount women when
they interact with women as citizens in the broader political and social
realm." 7 Communicative, republican democracy in society as a whole is
182. MacNeil/Lehrer, Conduct Unbecoming, supra note 163.
183. Michelman, Conceptions, supra note 105, at 450. See also supra notes 99-105 and accompanying
text.
184. During the investigation of the Tailhook incident, one of the senior admirals in charge of the
investigation reportedly called female pilots "prostitutes" and "go-go dancers." Defense Department Regular
Briefing, Sept. 24, 1992, Federal News Service.
185. Id. For more on the problems of command influence in the Naval Investigative Service, see Peter
Cary, Navy Justice, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 9, 1992, at 46.
186. In investigations after Tailhook designed to uncover similar problems within the Army,
investigators reported as many as 100 accusations of "open, vicious sexual harassment" by senior and
middle-level civilian supervisors against female civilian employees on one military base. Eric Schmitt,Army
Investigating Scores of Complaints of Sex Harassment, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1992, at Al.
187. Cf. Karst, supra note 6, at 525.
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difficult to achieve when men in the military lack interactions with women that
might result in revision of previously held beliefs about women's capabilities
or status.' Evidence of the connection between military policies and the
general position of women within the nation as a whole includes the common
claim that many would never accept a woman in the position of President of
the United States because they would not want a woman in the position of
Commander in Chief of the military. On issues of national security and foreign
policy, women's voices are rarely heard or taken seriously."9
Many feminists have argued that militarism itself teaches men that
oppression of women is acceptable and normal. 9 ' While this claim is
debatable, it is true that traditional military training practices tend to motivate
men by reference to the inferiority of women. This combination can result in
sometimes deadly hostility to women:
In one of the many press accounts following Tailhook, it was pointed
out that the airmen at the convention were fresh from flying bombing
sorties over Iraq. During the war, as they prepared to fly these
missions, many of them watched pornographic videos. Military training
is replete with the suggestion that violence and sexual potency are
inseparable.
There is not only the famous chant, "This is my rifle, this is my gun
(accompanied by a slap to the genitals), one is for killing, the other's
for fun," but also the running assumption, repeated in nearly every
drill, that virility is manifested by aggression, that a passive (or
pacifist) man is a "faggot" or "girl."
During combat in Vietnam, rape and murder had become frequent
enough to enter the slang of our armed forces. A "double veteran"
referred to a man who had sex with a woman and then killed her.'9 '
It would be remarkable if such training and culture did not lead to development
of lasting attitudes in young men that women are objects for men to fight over,
dominate, use, or even kill if a man's pleasure or purpose so dictates.
Military training also affects the attitudes of those in the armed forces about
gay men and lesbians. The exclusion of gay and lesbian citizens communicates
the message that these citizens are not even on the team - they are outsiders.
188. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
189. See also Karst, supra note 6, at 528 ("In a radio discussion of women in combat shortly after
the invasion of Panama, I heard a male retired general say, 'I have been there, and I know.' The subtext
was, 'You haven't been there, and you have no right to speak.'").
190. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 42 (1989).




Exclusion from military service and lack of acceptance in society reinforce
each other. Recruits who have never lived or worked with people of other
races learn to do so by necessity and by example in the military, but
homophobia is reinforced in an organization that vigorously asserts the
unacceptability of gay men and lesbians.
Exclusion of gay men and lesbians seriously interferes with promotion of
communicative politics and participatory, republican democracy. The ban
contributes to exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the national community
and lack of authoritative voice in the political realm. It denies to heterosexual
servicepersons the opportunity for political growth and self-development that
comes from communicative interaction with the full range of one's fellow
citizens. It denies to gay and lesbian citizens the opportunity to have their
voices heard and to challenge the interests, commitments, and opinions of
many of their fellow citizens during their most formative years. Military
exclusion policies influence the political and social life of the nation. Each
year, citizens who complete their military service return to civilian life and
politics and infuse the democratic discourse with disdain for the opinions and
leadership capabilities of women, and for the very existence of gay men and
lesbians as fellow citizens.
The comments of a former Air Force pilot's wife provide a raw example
of the interaction of exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the military and
from consideration as full citizens. During a talk show on which Colonel
Margarethe Cammermeyer, who was discharged in 1992 for stating she was
a lesbian, appeared, the caller exclaimed: "My husband spent thirty years in
the Air Force, thirty years of his life, to protect our country from people like
you. "192 The comment reveals not only lack of acceptance of gay men and
lesbians as co-equal citizens, but a perception that they are enemies of the
nation. If this woman's husband had served side by side with openly gay men
or lesbians in defense of the nation, her impressions might well have been
different.
The military claims that heterosexual servicepersons may exercise their free
speech right to call for gay rights or talk about issues of sexual orientation.
But mere speech about gay and lesbian rights by heterosexuals is no substitute
for the personal effect openly gay and lesbian persons have on their colleagues.
When a gay serviceperson such as Reverend and Captain Dusty Pruitt 93
comes out as a lesbian,
her straight Army colleagues and superiors [who] knew her as an
outstanding officer... are challenged to reconsider their understanding
of what it is to be homosexual-to reshape their abstract and
192. MacNeil/lehrer NewsHour Gays in the Military, (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1992,
Thursday Transcript #4497).
193. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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threatening idea of "a homosexual" in a way that will make room for
this real person whom they know and respect.194
Other prominent servicepersons discharged for homosexuality have similarly
changed their colleagues' assumptions about homosexuals. When Colonel
Margerethe Cammermeyer was discharged in 1992 from her position as Chief
Nurse of the Washington National Guard, her commanding officer wept as he
officiated over her expulsion.19 Col. Cammermeyer's discharge reverberated
throughout the military, affecting all the personnel with whom she had worked
during her twenty-seven years of service, including a fourteen month stint in
Vietnam which earned her a Bronze Star.196 Similarly, when Midshipman
Joseph Steffan was discharged for homosexuality shortly before his graduation
from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, his friends rallied around him,
and many more midshipmen at the academy expressed their support as well
as admiration for his courage and integrity. 97 By excluding gay and lesbian
voices, the military completely removes any hope of true communicative
interaction on the subject of sexual orientation and homophobia, and thus
substantially reduces the hope of such dialogue in the larger body politic
among a citizenry already conditioned to ignore or reject gay and lesbian
voices. "'
Exclusionary policies also interfere with the ability of citizens who spend
their formative years in the military to engage in dialogic self-government
when faced with the full range of political opinions, genders, and sexual
orientations of their fellow citizens after leaving the military. Citizens trained
in this manner learn to accept without question the attitudes and commitments
of their superiors and the military environment as a complete substitute for
dialogue, disagreement, and resolution through democratic means. As a result,
they may suffer from frustration or confusion when confronted with such
debate. These feelings may be suppressed or channelled into hostility toward
persons in groups from which they were kept isolated in the military.
194. Karst, supra note 6, at 562.
195. Timothy Egan, Dismissed From Army as Lesbian, Colonel Will Fight Homosexual Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 1, at 18.
196. Id.
197. JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY AMERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE HIS
COUNTRY 156-58 (1992). See also Jane Gross, Gay Sailor Back: "7 Will Be Test Case'", SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 13, 1992, at A3.
198. In the climate created by current exclusion policies, visibility as a gay man or lesbian may also
subject a servicemember to abuse at the hands of his or her colleagues. The Navy recently admitted that
a gay seaman awaiting discharge for homosexuality was murdered by two of his shipmates who had beaten
him so far "beyond recognition" that the seaman's mother was able to identify the body only by her son's
tattoos. Death of Gay Sailor is Investigated as Bias Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, § 1 at 17; H.G.
Reza, Homosexual Sailor Beaten to Death, Navy Confirms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al. Even if the
exclusion regulations are lifted, gay and lesbian servicemembers will be caught in a dangerous Catch-22:
changing their colleagues' attitudes may require coming out, but disclosing their sexual orientation leaves
open the threat of ostracism or even violent attack. This danger may be particularly great once the exclusion




The importance of communicative democracy within the military is not only
an issue of politics or the personal growth of servicepersons. The nation's
founders considered the existence of many subsections of citizens with differing
interests a crucial component of maintaining democratic government199 and
preventing the military from turning its weapons against the citizens it was
formed to protect.2" Current exclusionary policies turn the military into a
faction that is ignorant of and hostile to the interests of the excluded groups.
What is to prevent such a military from someday turning its weaponry against
women, lesbians or gay men? While the threat of full-scale military assault on
women, gay men or lesbians is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, hostility toward
these citizens by those in the military poses a threat on a smaller scale that is
no less cause for concern. Military men trained in hand-to-hand combat, whose
aggressiveness is honed in an environment condoning hostility to women, are
arguably more likely than men who are not so trained to engage in violent acts
against women in society, whether they be their girlfriends, wives or strangers.
Members of the military, often in groups, have physically attacked, severely
injured, and sometimes even murdered, gay men in areas near military
bases.20 1
The murder of Michael Wayne Hamilton by two Navy corpsmen illustrates
the potentially deadly consequences of hostility toward lesbians and gay men
that military culture breeds. The corpsmen met Hamilton in a Los Angeles area
known to be frequented by men interested in soliciting sex with other men.
They "got the older man drunk and waited until the time was right,"202 then
slashed Hamilton's throat and stabbed him eight times. Corpsman Todd Fluette
later defended his actions by explaining that he had never seen a homosexual
before and was "repulsed" and "infuriated" because Hamilton made advances
toward his buddy after the men had been drinking together for some time.203
When his friend did not react to Hamilton's touching, Fluette pulled out a
butterfly knife and slashed Hamilton's throat.2 " Given the context,
Hamilton's advances were not out of place. Fluette's reaction, especially his
refusal to believe that his buddy might have wanted sexual contact with a man,
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-24 (James Madison) (Mentor ed., 1961).
200. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Frank Buttino, Attacks on Gays, L.A. TtMEs, July 19, 1992, at B2 (Letter to Editor)
(describing recent assault on two gay men by "an active-duty Marine who was accompanied by two other
Marines" and charging that many of those responsible for gaybashings "are active-duty military people
assignedto San Diego."); GayBashing Charges Against Four Servicemen, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 1992,
at A26 (group of six men from Navy and Marines attacked gay man); Melissa Healy, Clinton to Stress
Conduct as Key for Gays in Military, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at Al (gaybashing by "bands of young
Marines" stationed near the nation's Capitol became commonplace in the summer of 1990, leading to formal
meetings between representatives of the gay and lesbian commuity and Marine Corps Commandant); Patrick
McCartney, Victim of Gay Bashing Sues City, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at B3 (gay man permanently
disfigured by three Navy recruits who kicked and beat him).
202. Thom Mrozek, Wife Testifies in Murder Trial, L.A. TaIEs, Aug. 21, 1992, at B2.
203. Id.
204. Id.; Thom Mrozek, Navy Corpsman Sentenced to Life in Park Slaying of Homosexual, L.A,
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1992, at B10.
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exemplifies the threat posed by military personnel inclined to act out hostilities
they learn in their military training against the very civilians they are supposed
to protect. Such incidents provide further caution against delegating full power
for creating and maintaining military culture to military decisionmakers.
V. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY
A. Discipline Within the Ranks
Defenders of the military's current speech, dress, and exclusion codes rely
on arguments that discipline is the military's major concern, is critical to the
nation's defense, and would be harmed by changes in military policies. Strict
discipline is necessary to condition soldiers to obey orders -quickly, without
questioning or hesitating, even under great stress and unpleasant conditions.
The traditional approach to military training relies on
physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence
of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination of values.
The process is designed to foster. . . doubts about previous beliefs and
experiences and to instill ... new values which [the institution] seeks
to impart.2 °5
Proponents of this system have insisted that homogeneity of gender is a
necessary element of such training.2 "s But integrated military units have
successfully trained recruits of different genders despite modification of the
traditional model. When the Navy began experimenting with sexually
integrated bootcamps, instructors discovered to their surprise that the integrated
setting improved the training by fostering increased cooperation and
teamwork.2 7 Such an experiment demonstrated that people do not have to
look or be the same to accomplish a task together.
Although homogeneity of uniforms also has been regarded as an essential
element of military training,208 people need not wear clothes that are identical
down to the last detail in order to accomplish their mission. While men and
women working in field assignments dress in identical uniforms,2° they do
205. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992).
206. See, e.g., id. at 896-98.
207. Anna Quindlen, Public & Private: With Extreme Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A21.
Since integrated boot camps were instituted at the Orlando Naval Training Center in February, 1992, "more
than half the sexually integrated companies have won the Navy's highest ranking, compared to an overall
rate of less than one percent during the Orlando base's 24-year history." Larry Rohter, Naval Training
Changes to Curb Sex Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at Al.
208. Absolute uniformity of hair and dress is one disciplinary tool. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
209. "Battle Dress Uniforms" or "BDUs" are the field uniform popularly known as "fatigues,"
consisting of combat boots, loose-fitting pants with gear pockets, a buttoned workshirt, T-shirt, and
functional hat with sun-visor.
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not wear identical standard or dress uniforms. The military apparently does
not believe it interferes with discipline when servicemen dress in slacks and
tied shoes while servicewomen dress either in slacks or skirts with pumps.
Men and women are also assigned significantly different styles of headgear.
Similarly, there is no reason to think that disobedience within the ranks would
follow if some servicepeople wore regulation yarmulkes or turbans while
others had traditional military headgear.21° Military personnel are already
trained to put aside racial and class preconceptions in order to work together
to accomplish their mission.
In contrast, a culture that breeds hostility and intolerance has been shown
to interfere with the maintenance of discipline and order. Ironically, an
institution that has supposedly required obedience and discipline has turned out
to be a breeding ground for disruptive, even criminal, behavior. The Tailhook
incident and allegations of widespread sexual harassment and rape constitute
extreme breaches of discipline,211 as does the recent murder of a gay seaman
by his shipmates."' Commitment to strict hierarchy may be undermined by
prejudices that are fed by exclusionary policies. For example, when
midshipmen in their plebe summer at the U.S. Naval Academy were
encouraged by upperclassmen to play a sexually harassing and humiliating
"practical joke" on their female squad leader.2"3 Such insubordination and
disrespect can only be explained by the prevalence of expressions of hostility
to women at the academy.
214
Similarly, aversion to allowing gay men and lesbians to serve in the
military recently led to a standoff of constitutional dimension between military
and civilian authorities. After a district court judge ordered the Navy to
temporarily reinstate gay Petty Officer Keith Meinhold,2"' Naval authorities
at Meinhold's base refused to take him back when he reported for duty. The
Navy backed down after Meinhold moved for contempt sanctions and the judge
reaffirmed his order, reminding the Navy that the United States "is not a
military dictatorship . . . . Here, the rule of law applies to the military."2 6
The Navy's contempt of the order, though brief, provided a glimpse of the
ultimate breakdown in military discipline: failure of military officials to obey
210. Indeed, in the wake of Congressional reaction to the decision in Goldman v. Weinberger, the
Air Force altered its regulations to allow for a "regulation yarmulke." The regulations, however, do not
appear to contemplate permitting religious headgear such as turbans. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
211. During the Gulf War, with its deployment of over 195,000 Army troops, Army women filed
16 complaints of sexual harassment by men, and six men were court-martialled for raping women. By
contrast, the Army's Criminal Investigative Division prosecuted only four cases of homosexual sodomy,
of which three were incidents of consensual sodomy. Jeff Stein, Gays in the Gulf They Were Far Better
Behaved than the Straights, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at Cl.
212. See supra note 198.
213. STEFFAN, supra note 197 at 56-58.
214. See id.
215. See supra note 60.
216. Seth Mydans, Navy is Ordered to Return Job to a Gay Sailor, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1992, at
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the orders of a civilian court.
Discipline need not imply enforced political disengagement by
servicemembers. As long as it is not coerced, involvement in politics,
including petitions to Congressional representatives," 7 should be permitted.
If the military were a citizen militia, we would expect citizen-soldiers to
discuss the politics or desirability of a mobilization even on the eve of a battle.
Shouldn't citizens in a democracy discuss issues as paramount to their nation's
survival such as whether to engage in an armed conflict? Why then should
servicepersons in the modern military be silenced on such matters? 2S In a
majoritarian democracy, the political branches may commit the nation to a war
and then demand that citizens who serve in the military, even dissenters,2 9
fight as the majority has decided. Thus in a military mobilization, disobedience
such as desertion or refusal to obey orders appropriately may be punished. But
in a democracy, matters of policy are never irrevocably decided. Dialogic
interaction, debate, and protest may all affect the course of a mobilization.
Military members' input in such debates provides important information and
perspective.
Disciplinary concerns or concerns about potential coercion of
servicepersons within the command structure may well necessitate greater
limitations on servicepersons' political activities than those placed on civilians.
Respect for participatory democracy, however, suggests that courts should
place the burden on military decisionmakers to defend their policies with
something more than vague references to the importance of discipline.
B. Threats to National Security Caused by Current Policies
Traditionalists repeatedly assert that the nation cannot afford to make the
military a "social laboratory for leading the breakdown of barriers.""2
Speculation that change within the military might weaken the armed forces in
unforseeable ways does not outweigh the concrete dangers posed to the nation
and its citizens by current policies of suppression and exclusion. Those
opposed to any change to current practices ignore threats to national security
caused by the policies that courts have let stand.
1. Military Coups
Some might argue that giving military members too much voice would
create the same problems feared by early republicans wary of a standing army.
Allowing political activity by servicemembers would risk politicizing the
217. Compare Brown, supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
218. Compare Parker, supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
219. Conscientious objectors may receive an exemption, an issue beyond the scope of this article.
220. MacNeil/Lehrer, Conduct Unbecoming, supra note 163 (quoting John Lehman, former naval
aviator and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration).
[Vol. 5: 1
Countenancing Corruption
military. Servicemembers might attempt to influence politics by voting as a
block, or even by threatening to use force or participating in a military
coup. 221 But protecting the rights of enlisted personnel to engage in ad hoc
or grassroots political actions such as signing petitions is unlikely to lead to
military overthrow. Rather, the real danger posed to democracy by military
efforts lies in the power of senior officers to organize and to command masses
of servicemembers in an effort to influence or to overthrow the civilian
government.222 The power and influence of senior military officials are
heightened by a doctrine of judicial deference that allows superiors to demand
unquestioned obedience to orders223 and discourages review of challenges
to regulations. If an officer ever sought to defy civilian authorities,
servicepersons who were absolutely obedient would follow their commander,
especially if they have been isolated from large segments of society and are
therefore potentially less reluctant to turn their weapons against the citizens
they are supposed to defend. If the courts refuse to question the military and
leave servicepersons unprotected by constitutional or other external civilian
restraints, military personnel will come to rely exclusively on the command
hierarchy for benefits and protection, and thus may develop a loyalty to their
commanders that surpasses their loyalty to the Constitution or civilian
authorities.
2. Internal Decline
At present, our democracy seems to be facing a crisis of political
participation more threatening than any external threat. Notwithstanding a high
turnout in the 1992 Presidential election, percentages of the population who
vote, let alone actively participate in politics in other ways, have fallen
drastically in past years. Many young people learn, or fail to learn, habits of
democracy in the first few years of reaching the age of majority. By
suppressing political participation, the military only exascerbates the problem.
It also impedes development of democratic participation skills including the
ability to encounter diverse perspectives or opinions. When military members
221. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841-42 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("the real
threat to the independence and neutrality of the military . . . -and the need to maintain as nearly as
possible a true 'wall' of separation-comes ... from the risk that a military commander might attempt
to 'deliver' his men's votes for a major-party candidate."); Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 96, at
405-06. Chief Justice Burger's concern was echoed during the 1992 elections in response to the Defense
Department's largest effort ever to encourage military personnel to vote. Barton Gellman, Pentagon Seeks
to Mobilize Voters: Effort Targets 75,000 "Counselors" to Get Troops to the Polls, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Sept. 27, 1992, at A23. While military members should be encouraged to vote, as long as the military
excludes whole segments of the citizenry, as it does now, and therefore breeds and strengthens particular
prejudices and ideologies, massive efforts by the executive branch to turn out the military vote should
indeed be a cause for scrutiny and concern.
222. Sugin, supra note 6, at 883.
223. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding air force regulations requiring service
members to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on the base) and text
accompanying notes 27-28.
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return to civilian life, they may do so with heightened willingness to censor
their opinions and to accept the actions of those in power without becoming
participants in democratic self-government.224
3. Dilution of Constitutional Protections
Judicial deference to the military also threatens to degrade constitutional
protections enjoyed by civilians. When the judiciary asserts as a general,
overriding rule that servicepersons have lesser constitutional protections than
other citizens because national defense so demands, it is in danger of breeding
a widespread conviction that constitutional protections are automatically
subservient to national security concerns-precisely the environment that
resulted in the Korematsu internments. 22
VI. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Because republicanism promotes self-government and places power in the
hands of the people, many neo-republicans object to modern applications of
republicanism that seem to rely on the judiciary as a primary player in reviving
civic republicanism. They are wary of the judiciary as an elitist institution and
suggest instead a need to "turn our attention to popular institutions,"22
especially local institutions and politics.227 The heightened judicial review
called for in this article may not appear to be a fitting civic-republican response
to the dangers of the standing army. But the judiciary serves an important
controlling and checking function in the United States' constitutional
democracy. Judicial review is an important component of civilian control of
the military directly limiting the power of the military and ensuring the public
greater scrutiny of military policies.
In addition, norms of justice in our political culture demand that "[e]very
norm, every time, requires explanation and justification in context." 221 Some
strains of civic republicanism conceive of judicial review as a means by which
the people are held to their highest ideals. Through reasoned resolution of
conflicts, the judiciary helps ensure that citizens are treated similarly, and that
the laws they make serve the citizenry as a whole, not just the self-interest of
a select few. Judicial review is also crucial to the civic-republican process of
self-development:
The Court helps protect the republican state-that is, the citizens
politically engaged-from lapsing into a politics of self-denial. It
224. See supra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
226. Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L. J. 1591, 1604 (1988).
227. Id. at 1605. See also Brest, supra note 100, at 1623.
228. Michelman, supra note 99, at 76.
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challenges "the people's" self-enclosing tendency to assume their own
moral completion as they now are and thus to deny to themselves the
plurality on which their capacity for transformative self-renewal
depends.229
Giving extensive power to review military affairs to the judiciary might
make civic republicans nervous. The judiciary is less accountable to the people
than the political branches and is particularly subject to control by elites. In
these respects, judicial review over the military could become a civic
republican's worst nightmare: a standing army accountable to a non-
accountable branch of the federal government. If the question were purely
whether there should be either judicial control or broader citizen control over
the military, republican reservations might counsel against urging a strong role
for the judiciary. But this is not the question facing the nation. Rather, we face
a situation in which the judiciary has come close to abdicating any role or
responsibility for reviewing questions regarding the military, leaving the people
and their representatives with the full burden of seeking to demand
accountability. At the very least, the judiciary must take greater responsibility
for insuring that power over military matters does not rest primarily with
military decisionmakers themselves.
VII. CONCLUSION
James Madison's well-known exhortation about the need to control factions
is no less important in the military context than in the political. The military,
even if it can be separated meaningfully from other governmental institutions
into its own functional and doctrinal sphere, cannot be separated from politics
or society as a whole.
The most critical aspect of the military's separateness is the practical reality
that it controls the nation's means of coercive force. It also wields
extraordinary economic power and is responsible for the training and
socialization of a large mass of the citizenry. If anything, the separateness of
such an entity calls for more skepticism and scrutiny, and more demanding
constitutional review than is demanded from any other political or
administrative sphere. As Madison reminds:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is,
229. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 100, at 1532.
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no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 23
Judicial review is a critical component of our constitutional system. When
the judiciary abdicates its role, it denies to the people an important layer of
protection. When the judiciary defers to military decisionmakers, it grants them
near-absolute power over the political and self-development of servicemembers
and gives them the power to influence not only military personnel, but the
nation as a whole. A doctrine of judicial deference to the military ignores the
wisdom and cautions of the nation's founders and the civic-republican ideals
that influenced them, and undermines the nation's ability to maintain and
strengthen democratic self-government in our modern, heterogeneous social
and political culture.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Mentor ed., 1961).
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As this article went to press, the military's exclusion of gay men and
lesbians was at the center of public debate. The present conflict confirms the
applicability and immediacy of the arguments set forth here. The delay of an
executive order lifing the ban represents, in part, blatant mollification of the
military out of fear that an order of the President, the highest civilian
authority, would be unenforceable in the face of massive resistance by military
leaders and personnel.
The conflict demonstrates the degree to which the military is a powerfid
player in the political system, a fourth branch of government which the
founders feared and excluded from the Constitution. Congressional reaction
to lifting the ban illustrates that many political leaders seek to maintain the
military as a faction within society, a group composed of a carefully crafted
subsection of the whole. These leaders attempt to use the military as apolitical
tool-as an internal political force pitting citizens against each other rather
than a force united against external threats to our national security.
Military personnel are entitled to express their opinions on this issue.
However, appreciation of the self-interested and biased nature of these views,
a product of current military culture, ought to temper reliance on
servicemembers' input. Harassment of and physical attacks on openly gay and
lesbian members of the military should be met with the harsh punishment
appropriate to such undisciplined, abusive, and illegal use of military force.
Despite the extensive attention recently paid to the ban on gay men and
lesbians in the military, media reports and commentary rarely discuss the issue
in systemic or constitutional terms. I hope that this article will shed light on
the broader implications of the current debate. The dynamics of this conflict
offer important lessons about maintaining a working democracy and insuring
civilian control of the military in a diverse society.
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